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"The Nation" and Ireland

BY LEWIS S. GANNETT

EAMON DE VALERA was a frequent visitor in the office of *The Nation* when he first came to America in 1919 to plead the cause of the Irish Republic. In those dark days of the struggling republic *The Nation* made its pages a forum for uncensored discussion of Ireland's wrongs.

But *The Nation* came closest to Ireland in 1920-21, in the darkest days of the Black and Tans, when it proposed the formation of the American Committee of One Hundred for the investigation of atrocities in Ireland. I remember well the day in 1920 when Dr. William J. M. A. Maloney came into our editorial conference, his heart aflame with a fire that inspired us all. America, he said, could force England to change its policy; but no paper in America that could command respect would dare to take the lead—except *The Nation*. The editors talked, voted, acted. Invitations were sent from *The Nation's* office to more than a hundred leading Americans to form a committee to summon witnesses from Ireland, to listen, and to report on facts.

It is interesting to look back upon the files of *The Nation* in that autumn of 1920 and note the names of those who dared accept. Hiram Johnson and David Walsh, then as now United States Senators, were among the first. Arthur Capper and "Old Bob" La Follette soon followed. One of the first to join was the president of the Board of Aldermen of New York City, a young man who signed his name F. H. LaGuardia. Cardinal Gibbons, Martin Conboy, Rabbi Judah L. Magnes, William Allan Neilson, and William Allen White were also among the early acceptances.

For Ireland, President de Valera assured the committee of his cooperation. In Washington the British ambassador gave his promise that no one would be denied passage to come and testify. The committee grew from 100 to 150. It elected Jane Addams, former Governor Joseph W. Folk of Missouri, Frederic C. Howe, James H. Maurer, and Senators Norris and Walsh to sit as its commission or "court." William MacDonald resigned from the staff of *The Nation* to serve as its secretary.

Meanwhile, Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, had died in prison after the most dramatic hunger strike in history. As Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in *The Nation* at the time, his soul triumphed over the flesh that a free Ireland might come to pass. His sister, Mary MacSwiney, and his lovely widow, Muriel Murphy MacSwiney, were among the first to come from Ireland to testify before the "American court" which had begun its sittings in Washington. Mary MacSwiney was an orator; but Muriel MacSwiney captured the heart of America. When those two women told their story of Black and Tan devastation, America listened. So did England.

Out of the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland grew, indirectly, the Committee for Relief in Ireland, which did such magnificent work, both in direct relief and in publicizing the need for relief, in 1920-21.

You can still follow the story in the files of *The Nation* for those years. *The Nation* made history in many ways, then as later. But I doubt whether anything it has ever done was more dramatic or more immediately and evidently effective than its formation of that American court which sat in judgment upon the British course in Ireland. It was done, it is worth recalling today, under the slogan, "No War with England." *The Nation* pointed out that the stories of Black and Tan pogroms exacerbated Anglo-American relations, and that an impartial establishment of the facts was essential to any frank relationship.

Whether the two commissions had as much to do with the eventual peaceful settlement and with the establishment of the Free State as Patrick McCartan, first envoy of the Irish Republic to the United States, suggests in his book, "With De Valera in America," or not, I do not know; but they played their part. The record of those days, of the inspiration the Irish patriots gave the editors and readers of *The Nation*, and of the aid *The Nation* was able to give Ireland, makes it peculiarly fitting for *The Nation* today to bring out this special issue dealing with Ireland's problems in the Second World War.

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America's Role in Irish Independence

BY SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE

EARLY in the summer of 1919 our national capital was treated to an elaborate and largely attended peace parade. The liberated nations were of course represented—all of the countries that had been carved out of the defeated empires by the victorious powers in accordance with their announced war aim of self-determination for small peoples.

Also represented was a small nation whose 750-year struggle for independence had been ignored by the peacemakers. Ireland, denied a hearing at the Peace Conference, had also been denied a place in the peace parade. Ireland was not free; on the contrary, it was at that time an occupied and devastated country. Obviously it had no place in a parade glorifying the liberation of oppressed nationalities by the Allied and Associated Powers. Yet there was Ireland, as persistent as Banquo's ghost, in the person of a lovely young girl wearing upon her fragile wrists the heavy chains of bondage. She stood in the back of an open car driven by a young man who had sworn to get her into the parade, permit or no permit, and did—repeatedly. At the beginning he actually managed to capture the lead. Afterward he kept the outraged marshals, aided by the police, busy driving the enslaved Eire out of the line of march, to the vast delight of the crowd. Thus he stole the show for Ireland; also the next day's headlines.

This dramatization of Ireland's unrighted wrongs originated in the mind of Katherine Hughes, a Canadian of Irish descent who was active in the Washington bureau of the Irish Progressive League. The enslaved Eire was Amelia Rossa, daughter of an American army officer. Her chariot was the automobile of John J. Noonan, a substantial Washington citizen and descendant of the Irish Nunans. And her charioteer was my younger brother, Warren J. La Follette. The whole stunt was symbolic not only of Ireland's plight but of America's attitude toward it. In 1919 the Irish propagandists were making excellent use in the United States of the material furnished them by British stupidity in Ireland; and they could count on the enthusiastic aid not only of Irish Americans but of Americans who weren't Irish at all.

Of course there had always been plenty of pro-Irish feeling in the United States. That was natural in a country with a large percentage of citizens who had either been themselves forced out of Ireland by British misrule or were descended from ancestors thus expatriated. America respected the Irish martyrs. It gave asylum to Irish refugees. This was a matter of course. But the disregard by the Peace Conference of the clearly expressed will of the Irish people, the general disappointment of the American people with the results of their crusade for democracy and their consequent revulsion against British influence, and above all their sense of decency and fair play, outraged by the continued oppression of the Irish people—all this combined to make the Irish cause more popular in the United States between the end of the war and the Anglo-Irish truce of 1921 than it had ever been before or has been since.

The Irish were in sore need of help and sympathy. Their case was desperate. From Easter Week, 1916, they had been in a state of war, without belligerent rights. And they could not hope to win, unaided, a war against the powerful British Empire. They needed support abroad—especially in the United States, to whose public opinion the British government was, for obvious reasons, peculiarly sensitive.

As one looks back upon the tragic history of that period in Anglo-Irish relations, one is struck by what a correspondent in the *Freeman*—which broke many a lance for Ireland—called "the real tragedy not of the struggle of right with wrong but of right with right." The British government and no doubt much of British opinion regarded the Easter Week rebellion as a treacherous stab in the back. From the point of view of British interest they were right. But from that of Irish interest they were not right at all. Oppressed peoples have always taken advantage of the moment when their oppressors were preoccupied with other wars to launch their own wars of liberation. And so you had Irish right against English right—and British official stupidity against both.

For at the beginning of the war the relations between the Irish and the British Empire seemed in a fair way to become brotherly. A Home Rule Act had been placed on the statute books which was so favorable to Southern Ireland that the Ulsterites under Sir Edward Carson were threatening civil war. It remained a dead letter; and the senseless humiliations visited by the British army upon the Irish volunteers who flocked to the empire forces added to the feeling of national outrage among the Irish people. Then came the ferocious stupidity of the British forces in suppressing the Easter Week rebellion. The uprising was small. British harshness toward its leaders, British murders of innocent people, and British attempts to cover up British crimes turned all Ireland into a Republican camp.

One of the great boons of democracy is that demo-

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cratic governments cannot get away with total persecution. The persecutions in Ireland seemed frightful at the time. And they were frightful. Yet by comparison with Nazi persecution in Poland or Greece, British rule in Ireland at the height of the terror looks like a mild regime. Elections continued to take place—won in large majority by the Republicans. And a year after the Easter rebellion the British government, although still in the midst of the war, released its surviving leaders from their British prisons. The force of liberal opinion in England had to be reckoned with, and so, after the entrance of the United States into the war, did the force of American liberal opinion. For the war aims announced by Woodrow Wilson's Administration were decidedly liberal, and neither government dared make them appear too much of a mockery.

A picture of The Nation *staff taken in December, 1920, shortly after Muriel MacSwiney, widow of Terence MacSwiney, and Mary MacSwiney, his sister, arrived in this country to testify before the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland. Mrs. MacSwiney is to the left and Miss MacSwiney to the right of Oswald Garrison Villard, directly behind the desk.*

It was in the uncertain atmosphere created by liberal war aims and illiberal persecution of thought that the Irish contenders for American public opinion had to press their claims against a government which had the immense advantage of being an ally of the United States. British influence was in the ascendancy, and to oppose it was considered almost as grave an offense as to oppose the American government. Yet even during this period the shrewd propaganda of Ireland's American supporters twice defeated British moves to conscript Irish citizens.

It was after the war, however, that the Irish movement in America really got into its stride. On December 14, 1918, the Republicans won two-thirds of the seats in the Irish elections to the British Parliament. The Sinn Fein had waged the campaign on the issue of separation from England; consequently Patrick McCartan, envoy in America of the "Provisional Irish Government," took the position that the election had established the republic. He proclaimed the republic to citizens of Ireland resident in the United States and Canada; he proclaimed it to the American government and the diplomatic representatives of foreign countries. And since the envoy of a provisional government is above all a propagandist, he saw to it that copies of these proclamations reached the American press, which gave them sensational and nation-wide publicity. The cause of Ireland was beginning to go spectacularly well in the United States.

It continued to prosper. On January 21, 1919, the representatives of Sinn Fein met in Dublin as the Dail Eireann, proclaimed the independent Irish Republic, and called for its recognition. They appointed Eamon de Valera, Arthur Griffith, and Count George Noble Plunkett to present Ireland's claim to independence at the Peace Conference. In America an Irish Race Convention at Philadelphia appointed representatives to press the Irish claim before the conference, and to the astonishment of the Irish-American leaders subscribed a victory fund of more than a million and a half dollars to finance the Irish cause. On March 4, 1919, the House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing the hope that the Peace Conference would consider the claim of Ireland to self-determination. On June 19 the Senate passed a resolution requesting the American envoys to the Peace Conference to attempt to secure a hearing for the Irish delegation. The American people, through their representatives in Congress, had officially recognized the justice of the Irish claim to freedom and self-government.

But the will of the American people went unheeded by their President. Mr. Wilson had agreed with the other members of the Big Four—Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando—that no claim should be brought before them except by unanimous consent. This agreement of course ruled out Ireland. There are those who contend that Mr. Wilson's complaisance in this matter was dictated less by love of England than by fear that the British government might discover among the Central American republics some claim to consideration equally valid with

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that of Ireland. Whatever the reason for it, his failure to comply with the request of Congress increased the uneasiness of the American people about the labors of Versailles, for to a great many of them the case of Ireland had become the touchstone of British and American official sincerity.

Their uneasiness was not diminished by the report on Ireland issued by two members of the Irish-American delegation to Versailles, Frank P. Walsh and Edward F. Dunne. It had a strange origin. Finding that it could get nowhere with the British at Versailles, the Irish-American delegation asked for and obtained British diplomatic passports for a visit to Ireland. Whether these passports were granted through British magnanimity or British stupidity seems never to have been determined. In either case, the situation which the delegates were enabled to investigate was appalling. Their report setting forth the facts succeeded in infuriating British opinion, outraging American opinion, and annoying Mr. Wilson very much. It was at this auspicious moment that Eamon de Valera arrived in America as a stowaway and declared himself to be the President of the Irish Republic.

Mr. de Valera had many claims to American interest. First, he had been born here. Second, he had been a leader of the Easter Week rebellion and had been condemned to death with the other leaders. He had been in an English jail and had been rescued by two loyal comrades. Last and most important, he was the leader of the Dail Eireann, chosen by it to be president of the republic which the justice of the Irish cause, the excellence of Irish propaganda, and the stubbornness of the British and American governments had made extremely popular in America. His tour of this country became a triumphal progress. That part of American sentiment which was veering away from Wilson fastened on the young Irish President as a symbol of its disillusionment. Legislatures passed resolutions calling for recognition of the Irish Republic; citizens signed petitions to the same purpose; and the American public bought some $15,000,000 of its bonds.

One cannot say whether or not all this enthusiasm might have led to recognition of the Irish Republic by Congressional action. For a split among the Irish leaders in America prevented them from taking full advantage of American friendship for the Irish people. Basically this split, whose merits I do not feel qualified to judge, arose from a difference of opinion on the question whether the Irish Republic did or did not exist. On the one side was the most prominent of the Irish-American leaders, Judge Cohalan of New York, who held that the republic did not exist. On the other side was the republic's envoy to America, Patrick McCartan, who emphatically held that it did exist. Each, of course, represented an aspect of Irish sentiment in America, although the line was not very clear because Judge Cohalan had a way of suddenly pleading for the republic at meetings. And somewhere in the middle, it would appear, was President de Valera.

This internecine warfare, which for a long time was kept behind the scenes, finally culminated in a deadly feud between De Valera and Cohalan, in the course of which both went to the Chicago convention of the Republican Party in June, 1920, where they seem to have fought, like the two magpies on the garden rail, until nothing was left of either of them. When the Republican platform appeared, it contained no reference to Ireland or the Irish Republic.

Whether or not it was this bitter struggle among the Irish leaders in America which caused the British government to resume the terror in Ireland, certain it is that the terror was resumed. The British government had suppressed the Dail Eireann on September 15, 1919. On March 20, 1920, Thomas MacCurtain, Lord Mayor of Cork, was murdered by English soldiers. Other murders followed. From London came dispatches to the effect that the Irish were planning another Easter Week insurrection, and that the British army and navy were moving in to handle it. The era of the Black and Tans was beginning.

If the dispatches about these British preparations were intended to prepare American sentiment to condone British violence against the Irish people, they were frustrated by the action of Dr. William J. M. A. Maloney, who organized and directed the picketing of the British embassy by American women. Dr. Maloney had intended this action to be in the interest of recognition, and in preparation for it he had persuaded Albert Jay Nock, editor of the *Freeman,* to write an editorial taking the position that Congress, by its resolutions addressed to the Peace Conference, had already recognized the Irish Republic. The *Freeman* suggested that "in the event of further military atrocities in Ireland, the Congress could denounce, and should promptly denounce, our existing commercial treaties with England, precisely as our treaties with Russia were denounced in 1911 on account of discrimination against the Jews." Dr. Maloney's pickets distributed broadsheets calling upon Congress to stop the atrocities in Ireland by abrogating the treaties with Great Britain. The pickets were arrested; Secretary Colby expressed the government's chagrin; the pickets came out with banners quoting some remarks of Mr. Colby's in 1916 condemning the English for the Easter Week executions; Mr. Colby sued for peace. There was no Irish insurrection put down by British arms during Easter Week, 1920.

But the terror did not cease. Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, was arrested on August 12 and refused to recognize the British authority. On October 25 his long hunger strike ended in death in a London jail. He had become one of the long list of Irish martyrs, and the

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most famous of all, revered by a world which had watched incredulous through the long weeks of his martyrdom. Meanwhile *The Nation* had formed its Committee of One Hundred, and that committee had formed the commission which took evidence in Washington on the atrocities perpetrated in Ireland by British troops.

The commission's report was a terrible indictment of British misrule. It aroused in England the wrath of the liberals and labor, who had always opposed the course of oppression in Ireland; and the pressure of British opinion at last forced the British government to seek a settlement of Anglo-Irish differences. With the nature of that settlement and its consequences the American people of course had nothing to do. Their last great demonstration of sympathy with the Irish cause was the contribution of more than $5,000,000 for Irish relief. The campaign for this fund was indorsed by President Harding, a fact which did not lessen the annoyance of the British ambassador, Sir Auckland Geddes. Ireland, Sir Auckland maintained, was the most prosperous part of the British Empire and in no need of relief. Whereupon liberal opinion in America began to suggest that it would be just as well if Sir Auckland were recalled.

The fight for American favor was one of the last and most bitterly contested struggles between the British and rebel Ireland. The Irish won, and the wounds they inflicted on British prestige have never healed entirely. One may see their effect in the hatred which has blinded so many Americans not only to the heroism of the British people in their struggle against Nazi Germany but even to American self-interest in that struggle. Thus are the sins of government visited upon the governed. And thus do impressions created in the popular mind by a given set of conditions become stereotypes which persist long after those conditions have ceased to exist.

Ireland Will Respond

BY GEORGE W. NORRIS

FOR many years I have watched Ireland's struggle for independence with great sympathy. Twenty years ago I was associated in a small way with the campaign carried on by *The Nation* which succeeded in bringing the suffering of Irish patriots to the attention of the people of the United States. The response of the American public to these disclosures played a part, I believe, in the final realization of the Irish dream of freedom.

In saying this, of course, I do not mean to detract in any sense from the magnificent personal achievements of Ireland's present Prime Minister, Eamon de Valera. Few men of this generation have provided more devoted leadership to their country. His patient, persistent, effective efforts will always stand as an inspiration for those who believe, as I do, that fundamental reforms can best be achieved by peaceful and lawful methods.

Today that belief—which is the foundation-stone of democracy—is being challenged as never before in recent history. A victory for Hitler would not only wipe out the results of a lifetime of work for Irish independence but would destroy the very basis upon which that independence has been built. It is not my place to say what Irish policy should be in this crisis. No one sympathizes more than I with Eire's desire to remain out of the war. But in view of its long record of passionate devotion to freedom, I have no doubt that, rather than see tyranny triumph, Ireland will render such assistance as is necessary to the United States and the other countries fighting aggression.

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Drawings by Dolbin, John Groth, and Low.

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Eamon de Valera, Emancipator

BY MARGARET MARSHALL

IF THERE had been no United States, there would never have been an Irish Republic." This statement is taken from a speech delivered at Birmingham, Alabama, in 1920 by Eamon de Valera in the course of his country-wide campaign to arouse support for the

Eamon de Valera

Irish Nationalists and to obtain recognition of Ireland's independence by the United States.

It might almost be said, likewise, that if there had been no United States there would never have been an Eamon de Valera, for the present Prime Minister and real head of Eire was born in New York City in 1882, of a Spanish father and an Irish mother. When Eamon, christened Edward, was two, his father died, and the child went to live with an uncle at Bruree, County Limerick. His ties with the United States were not broken—his mother, who remarried, lived in this country until her death in 1932—but they must have seemed tenuous to one who had left it at so early an age. In 1916, however, when De Valera was thirty-four, his link with the United States became vital in the most literal sense of the word. For De Valera not only owes his life to America in the elementary sense of having been born here, but when, with other leaders of the Easter rebellion he was sentenced to death by the British government, the fact that he could claim American citizenship played a decisive part in saving him from execution. And this circumstance, in turn, thrust him into the position of leadership which he has maintained, with only one major interruption, to this day. He was the only commander in the Easter rebellion who escaped execution; he was also the last commander to surrender in that dramatic and desperate fight. It was inevitable that his fellow Irish prisoners, first in Dartmoor and then in Lewes, should look to him for direction. Thus leadership devolved upon him primarily by reason of a seniority resulting from his connection with America; he retained it by force of circumstance and character.

Up to the time of the Easter rebellion, and indeed until his imprisonment in Dartmoor and Lewes, De Valera had been a minor figure in the Irish struggle. As a youth he had been primarily a student, a winner of prizes and scholarships—though he had also taken an active part in school athletics. He began his adult life as a teacher of mathematics and physics at Rockwell College. He became interested in the Irish language, but there is no record of any driving political interest, and up to 1914 he was completely unknown to the general public even in Dublin. When Patrick Pearse organized the Irish Volunteers, De Valera joined them and became a junior officer. He was not, however, a member of the secret society, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, which was the dynamo of Irish nationalism, although he was counted among the "unsuspectables" who served as an innocent front for the I. R. B. When John Redmond committed Ireland to the British side in the First World War, De Valera was a member of the minority of the Irish Volunteers who refused to follow Redmond. The majority, some 160,000, were drawn off, many of them to death in France; the minority of about 12,000 remained to carry on the fight for Irish independence. Even then, he was not included in the inner councils of the I. R. B., which was preparing for an insurrection. De Valera, writes his biographer Denis Gwynn, "was opposed to the insurrection, as most people were, but when the final orders came, he obeyed orders and fought through the whole week." At the end he is said to have remarked, "If only the people had come out with knives and forks."

De Valera's sentence had been commuted from death to penal servitude for life, but he and his companions were released some months later in one of the British moves toward conciliation which alternated so crazily through the years with the British essays in brutal suppression. He returned to Dublin and was immediately elected president of the Sinn Fein; he was also made president of the Irish Volunteers. He was, in a word,

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In February, 1919, De Valera escaped from Lincoln Gaol, the story of his delivery being one of the more sensational episodes in the long history of prison breaks. After remaining hidden in England for a while, he was smuggled into Ireland in time to attend the secret meetings of the Dail which preceded its first public session on April 10. As chairman of the Dail, De Valera set up a Cabinet. By this time the hopes of the Sinn Fein had centered on the Peace Conference in Paris, where they counted upon Woodrow Wilson, champion of small nations and representative of the largest body of Irishmen in the world—the 20,000,000 Americans of Irish descent—to aid their cause. In Lincoln Gaol De Valera too had decided that Ireland's hopes lay in Versailles—and in America. He had determined, moreover, to go to America himself.

His colleagues in Dublin disapproved of his plan, but his obstinacy, as one biographer puts it, "was always inflexible," and he had his way. The difficulties were enormous. There was no hope of a passport; De Valera was almost impossible to disguise. But the difficulties were overcome; he was smuggled first to Liverpool and then on board a ship bound for America. And in June, 1919, the stowaway arrived in New York City, to be miraculously produced when the campaign to obtain United States recognition for Ireland's independence was at its height.

For eighteen months De Valera spoke before huge audiences from one end of the country to the other and was interviewed by the press wherever he went. The details of the American campaign, many of them fantastic, may be found in Patrick McCartan's book, "With De Valera in America." Suffice to say that the Irish issue became an American issue, deeply entangled with the fight over the League of Nations, with the Irish throwing their weight against American participation once they had lost their own fight for recognition at the Peace Conference.

De Valera's office in Dublin is graced by a statue of Lincoln; a copy of the American Declaration of Independence hangs on its walls. And with the entrance of America into the war, his relationship to this country once more takes on importance. Only this time it is America which expects help from De Valera. Americans understand why many Irishmen hate Great Britain because De Valera and the Friends of Irish Freedom, greatly assisted by the Black and Tans, gave them a thorough education along those lines in 1919 and 1920. They understand, too, why Ireland, which is defenseless against air attack, has clung to neutrality. But they know that Ireland's position in the Battle of the Atlantic may decide the outcome of the larger battle in which the Nazis are striking for the control of the world, with America as their strongest opponent; and that De Valera's life work, an independent Irish republic, is one of the stakes.

De Valera's Farewell to America

"Land of the free and home of the brave, Farewell! May you ever remain as I have known you, land of the generous-hearted and the kindly. May you stand through time as they would have you who love you—Liberty's chosen champion; and oh, may you never know yourself the agony of a foreign master's lash.

I came to you on a holy mission, a mission of Freedom; I return to my people who sent me, not indeed, as I had dreamed it, with the mission accomplished, but, withal, a message that will cheer in the dark days that have come upon them, and that will inspire the acceptance of such sacrifices as must yet be made.

So farewell—young, fortunate, mighty land; no wish that I can express can measure the depth of my esteem for you or my desire for your welfare and glory. And farewell the many dear friends I have made and the tens of thousands who, for the reason that I was the representative of a noble nation and a storied, appealing cause, gave me honors they denied to princes—you will not need to be assured that Ireland will not forget and that Ireland will not be ungrateful." (Released in New York City on January 3, 1921.)

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Will Hitler Take Ireland?

BY WILLIAM L. SHIRER

ABOUT the time the last ill-equipped British troops were fleeing pell-mell from Aandalsnes and Namsos to make Hitler's conquest of Norway complete, and the thoughts of Nazis in Berlin had turned to the next step—invasion of the Lowlands—I had a talk with a German naval officer attached to the High Command.

He was puzzled. He could not understand the British, he said. He could not understand their unbelievable timidity in the Norwegian campaign. In the other war he had been a submarine captain. Like all German naval officers in that war he had come to have a great respect for the British navy and, indeed, for British character. "But in Norway," he kept saying, "I do not understand them. Is it true, as the Führer thinks, that the British have lost their greatness, their *aggressiveness?*"

The lack of aggressiveness, it was plain, stumped him. Our talk turned to Ireland. Through his submarine periscope he had often gazed on Ireland's green hills, and he liked them. But he did not like, he said, the little boats that used to pop out from the Irish ports and shake him with their depth bombs, or the planes that came out from the Irish landing fields or seaplane bases and made it dangerous to come up even to periscope level during the daylight hours. Suddenly he grew excited.

"Can you tell me," he shouted, "*why* the British haven't moved into Eire, or at least into their old bases there?"

I tried to say something about Eire being a free and sovereign nation and at peace with Britain, but he just stared at me in complete incomprehension. Now for the first time in that shocking spring of 1940 I realized that I was sputtering hollow words out of another world—a dead one, if our side would only realize it.

"Why don't they take those Irish bases?" he interrupted. "Or is that imbecile Ribbentrop right about the British?" I didn't know the answer. All I knew was that my naval officer and every other officer under Hitler would have had those Irish bases long before if they had been in Britain's position, and that the only man in town who didn't realize it was the Irish minister. We had other things to think about within a few days. Hitler invaded Holland and Belgium, to which he had given even more binding guaranties of non-aggression than he had given Eamon de Valera's nation.

That fall, after the Netherlands and Belgium and France had been pulverized, I had another talk with the naval officer. We had both been up on the Channel to watch the Battle of Britain. The Germans had lost it, and he knew it. He was a bit subdued. But his mind was full of something else by this time. Like all German naval officers he was now concentrating on another phase of the war—the Battle of the Atlantic. Our talk turned to Eire. He still could not understand why the British had not seized the Irish bases. But he was not so explosive about it this time. He was just relieved. New tactics were being employed by the High Command in its counter-blockade against Britain. Submarines and long-distance bombers from bases in Brittany were slipping out past southern Eire. Their coordination was good. And northwest of Ireland they were beginning to bag droves of British ships. The strategical position of Ireland had changed somewhat since our last talk. As a matter of fact, said the officer, Eire had become a key position in the two great battles that, as he thought then, lay ahead—the Battle of the Atlantic and the new Battle of Britain. His ideas were not startling. They seemed obvious—and still do—to any schoolboy. They may be summed up as follows:

That part of the German naval and air forces charged with blockading Britain had gained an enormous advantage by the occupation of the naval and air bases of western and northwestern France. No more long and hazardous trips for the U-boats from Wilhelmshaven or Emden up through the North Sea and around the Shetland Islands and Scotland—a course a thousand miles long—before the submarines could even get to the Atlantic sea lanes. Now a short run of four or five hundred miles from Brest put the submersibles west of Ireland. And the new long-range Focke-Wulf bombers operating from the tip of the Brittany peninsula made perfect spotters for German submarines, which were now operating in packs instead of singly as in the last war. There was only one danger. British fighter planes operating from southwestern Eire could play havoc with the German bombers coming out from behind Brest. British patrol planes based on southern Ireland could make it nasty for the U-boats. British destroyers and other small anti-submarine craft from nearby Irish bases could make it worse than nasty. But the Germans didn't have to worry about that now. Strange as it seemed, the British had not occupied the Irish bases even after Brest and Lorient and Bordeaux fell. De Valera appeared firm in resisting British pressure. And if he ever began to weaken, the Luftwaffe could toss a few bombs on Eire as just a little reminder of what could happen were he

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to weaken further. This reminder technique was later carried out.

So much for the Battle of the Atlantic. As to the Battle of Britain, the officer merely confirmed what one had heard among German officers up on the Channel during the air battles for Britain. Even if the first attempt to land troops on England failed, or went slowly, the seizure of Eire would be a fairly easy matter. Parachute troops would take the key points. And even though shipping losses at first would be great, enough ships could get through to bring the small number of tanks, guns, and oil necessary to establish a firm foothold. And when this was done, it might not even be necessary to invade England. For once Ireland was captured, the United Kingdom would be shut off from America. It was already shut off from the Continent. It could be forced into surrender within a short time, if only from starvation. I can't guarantee that this was exactly what was in the mind of Hitler and his field marshals. But certainly this general idea was expressed by numerous army and navy officers as early as August, 1940.

Why didn't Hitler carry it out, then? Why didn't he strike at Eire? There are at least three reasons. The failure of the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the British Isles in the Battle of Britain forced him to postpone the entire invasion project. That failure also convinced him that it would be folly to risk his entire air force against Britain as long as Russia had a powerful one in his rear. The second reason was Hitler's realization that a neutral, independent Eire gave him great advantages in the Battle of the Atlantic. The third was his conviction that an attack on Ireland would bring the United States into the war.

As the winter of 1940-41 progressed, Hitler's reasoning seemed to be more and more justified by the facts. Allied shipping losses rose to staggering heights. The combination of U-boats and long-range planes operating from French bases and making their way uninterrupted around southern and western Eire to the killing grounds west of Ireland threatened to become more successful than even Admiral von Tirpitz's all-out submarine campaign which almost brought Britain to her knees in 1917.

As for the last point—bringing the United States into the war—Hitler wanted to postpone this as long as possible, or at least until he could talk Japan into taking us on in the Pacific. Until he was ready to invade Britain it would be foolish to provoke America over Ireland. Moreover, Hitler knew that influential sections of the Irish-American population of the United States were among the strongest elements working to keep America out of the war. As long as he refrained from an attack



Who's Next?

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on Ireland they would give him valuable—if unconscious—aid. And in the meantime his very threat of an eventual attack on Ireland kept at least one full motorized British division immobilized in Northern Ireland, a division he knew was badly needed in Egypt.

It is said in Dublin that the present government of Eire fears that the granting of bases to the Allies would precipitate a German attack. This is certainly true. Dublin and Cork and the other cities would be immediately bombed by the Luftwaffe. Irishmen would be killed. But tragic as that would be, it is not the point. Mr. de Valera's refusal to grant bases to the Allies will not save his country from attack by Hitler in the end, any more than Norway's or Holland's or Belgium's strict neutrality saved them from attack when Hitler found it expedient to smash them. The Nazis will not have the qualms which the British have had about Eire. And once the Nazis are in Dublin, Irish freedom and independence, which were won so late and after so much sacrifice, will be snuffed out. The Nazis tell the Irish a different story, but even Dublin can have no illusions as to this.

One night in Berlin I heard the German radio broadcast a play based on the life of Sir Roger Casement. At the end of his trial, in June, 1916, after he had been sentenced to death for high treason, Casement made a speech which will live as long as the English language. The Nazis, I thought, rather bungled it, but their version recalled to me one of the many noble utterances in that speech as I had read it years before. "Ireland," Sir Roger said, "has outlived the failure of all her hopes."

I thought of it again the other day (January 12) when Mr. de Valera was moved to remark: "We will avoid war, please God, unless we are attacked."

It is a noble hope, like so many others that Ireland has had, but in this Hitlerian world it seems doomed to failure. And to cling to it to the extent of permitting a Nazi victory would result in the failure of the greatest Irish hope of all, the one that became a great reality—Irish liberty and independence. That failure Ireland might never outlive.

Ireland's Strategic Position

BY DONALD W. MITCHELL

THE great Napoleon, surveying the mistakes of his career from the vantage of St. Helena, regretfully concluded, "Had I gone to Ireland instead of to Egypt, the empire of England was at an end."

Few other statesmen—until in our time Winston Churchill—have had the constructive imagination and astuteness to appreciate Ireland's importance. Lying only a few miles west of the larger island, it has always seemed more an appanage of England than a separate entity. Yet any map reveals Ireland's vital strategic position in relation to British communications. About three-fourths of Britain's food and much of the raw material of its industry are produced abroad, and the ships that bring these supplies, as they approach England, converge in the seas directly west of Ireland into a bottleneck only a few hundred miles wide. Any menace to shipping at this point would cut the British life line.

Today the importance of Ireland to the defense of England is even greater than in Napoleon's time. Then invasion by sea alone was practical, and enemy commerce could be attacked only from the sea. Today the Germans have proved in Crete and Norway that aerial invasions from nearby bases are entirely feasible, and the U-boat and bomber have greatly increased the threat to commerce.

In the First World War Great Britain stood so near defeat that Germany actually set November, 1917, as the date when sinkings of a million tons a month would bring about British surrender. That this result did not follow was not Germany's fault. Under the urgings of America's Vice-Admiral Sims, the British Admiralty finally permitted a trial of convoys, sailing under escort from the bases of western Ireland. With the convoy system in force, losses declined 90 per cent at once, and the menace of the submarine was removed. In all wars the side operating closest to its bases has an important advantage. The adoption of convoys based on Ireland gave this advantage to the Allies.

In 1939 Great Britain entered the Second World War with the confidence born of having successfully defeated submarines in the past. Mine fields and a blockade were set up at once in the Straits of Dover and the North Sea. Convoys were also employed but with greatly lessened effectiveness because the Irish bases which had served in 1917 and 1918 were not available. The hundreds of miles of extra voyaging required rendered the individual destroyer at least 20 per cent less efficient than in the First World War. Soon the rapid Nazi conquest of ports from Norway to Spain gave the enemy submarine and bomber bases dangerously close to the British Isles, whose defenders could operate only from English and Northern Irish ports. If lack of Irish bases reduced the efficiency of naval escort, it hurt reconnaissance planes even more. Whole squadrons of relatively

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cheap short-radius planes were unusable unless they could be flown from Irish bases or at least over Irish territory. When permission to do so was not forthcoming, the British government, though its very existence depended upon the success of anti-submarine measures, refused to violate the air of its small neighbor.

In the first half of 1941 shipping losses presented as great a threat to British existence as in 1917. The Germans changed their technique, and submarines attacked their prey in packs guided by long-range Focke-Wulf bombers. The individual torpedo gave way to torpedo clusters. Mine fields and blockades lost nearly all their old effectiveness as a result of the vast Nazi advantage in bases. America transferred bottoms from its own merchant marine, but replacements failed to keep pace with sinkings. Relief in the form of newly completed American ships was six months to a year away. The British navy had only about half the number of anti-submarine ships that it used in the First World War. Supplies were got through with increasing difficulty, and rationing was drawn tighter at a time when the Germans were able to loosen their belts a few notches. Stockpiles of raw materials were being rapidly used up, but steel was left on the docks by ships that took food instead. Private estimates based on the rate of sinkings placed British collapse between the late fall of 1941 and the middle of 1942.

When the final history of the present war is written, Hitler's failure to follow through with an all-out effort at sea and in the Near East when he was winning in both campaigns and his decision to attack Russia instead will doubtless be considered his greatest mistakes. A considerable number of submarines and a very large portion of the *Luftwaffe* had to be withdrawn to fight in the east. And in the same months that saw a slackening of the German effort at sea came a speeding up of shipbuilding in this country and the entry of the United States navy into active hostilities. Since July, 1941, shipping losses have gone up and down, but mainly down. The German U-boat fleet has been considerably reduced, and a shortage of men for crews has been reported. Replacements of Allied shipping losses are also becoming much more rapid.

The danger, however, will last as long as the war. For some time there have been growing rumors of tremendously increased shipbuilding in countries under Axis domination, of twenty-four-hour days at dockyards. Washington fears a new outbreak of submarines and raider activity as part of a campaign to retrieve recent German losses. Unless the Allies are willing to abandon the Far East to Japan in the ill-founded hope that they can later recover the offensive, American sea power must be transferred to the Pacific in full strength, thus cutting convoy protection in half at a time when there is strong indication of acute danger. If Britain in the



Graphic by Pick-S

earlier part of the war could not stand without this American help, is it able to do so now? And if it is, can the North Atlantic be made safe enough for the transport of the new A. E. F. which our present war plans contemplate as necessary for the final defeat of Hitler?

Granted that we need Irish bases to launch an offensive against Germany, would such a move be beneficial to Ireland? In answering this question it must be recalled that only three courses are open to the Irish, each with its own dangers. Irish bases may be made available to Allied use with or without active Irish participation in the war; Eire may remain strictly neutral; or, finally, Eire may either allow Germany to use its bases or, much more likely, may be conquered and unable to deny such use.

By neutrality the Irish have gained from both belligerents a fair amount of respect for their territory. Hitler has found it convenient to keep Ireland as neutral as possible since its belligerency would present his enemy with bases from which the German counter-blockade could be more effectively prevented. Allied use of Irish bases might draw some air raids, though the German air force is very busily occupied elsewhere, and the all-out raids used early in the war have long since been proved unprofitable. Moreover, Ireland is farther than England from German bases, and the Irish countryside, as compared with Britain, presents a decided lack of military objectives.

On the other hand, the continuation of the present policy of strict neutrality entails enormous risks. The Irish have been unable to get badly needed weapons from the "arsenal of democracy" because the United States naturally prefers its weapons to be used actively to overthrow Hitler. Should Eire's neutrality cripple the Allies sufficiently to bring about loss of the war, its situation would make all past misfortunes shrink to nothing by comparison.

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But a greater risk than that of ultimate Allied defeat is the generally overlooked but very possible chance of German invasion and conquest. The distance from Brest to Cork is well under three hundred miles. Ireland is thus about as close to German bases in France as was Crete to Hitler's Greek bases and is considerably closer than was Norway to Germany. An expedition sent by sea is not likely, but an aerial invasion offers problems no greater than those Germany has solved elsewhere. The often repeated query, "If Hitler couldn't cross twenty miles of the English Channel, how can he cross 300 miles of ocean?" offers no comfort here. Strong British sea, air, and land forces rather than twenty miles of water were the obstacle. Ireland, with half a dozen police boats, 10,000 poorly equipped regular troops, and a minute air force, has no protection worthy of the name. No one questions Irish bravery, but bravery on the part of the unprepared merely adds to the inevitable slaughter.

In enemy hands Ireland would, as Napoleon perceived, threaten the very existence of the British Empire. Germany would then have bases within close bombing distance of every point in England, bases which would so dominate shipping lines to the west that convoys would be a prey to submarines and planes of all types. Protecting British planes would have to operate farther from their bases than the planes of the attacker. The life line across the Atlantic would be cut. Finally, Ireland is not to be despised as a possible land base from which Great Britain could be invaded by way of relatively unprepared Scotland and Wales.

When Hitler fails in a campaign, he immediately turns to some other and more promising field. He has just sustained defeats in Russia and North Africa. Unless his losses have been even more serious than is commonly believed, he will try to regain prestige by a successful campaign elsewhere. There would be no point in conquering Sweden or Switzerland, which are already within the German system. A possible objective is the British position in the Near East, to be attacked either through Turkey or from Crete. Perhaps more probable is a thrust through Spain at Gibraltar and North Africa.

The Near East and Mesopotamian oil would have been attractive objectives six months ago but are much less so today. The British position has been reinforced with men and large quantities of war supplies, and an Axis campaign would now be an expensive and extremely doubtful undertaking. A push through Spain to Gibraltar and North Africa is possible but would be almost certain to bring American seizures of nearby bases in the islands of the eastern Atlantic. Success would, of course, close the western Mediterranean to Allied shipping, but little use has been made of this route anyway. Needed raw materials for Germany cannot be obtained through this action.

A third possibility is an attack on the British Isles or on Ireland alone. In view of increasing British strength in the air, this would seem a desperate chance, but probably the risks are no greater than some Hitler has taken in the past and the rewards for success would be much larger. There are some indications that this move may actually be under consideration. Swedish sources report extensive German reinforcements along the European coast, possibly in preparation for a new offensive.

In case of a German attack on Ireland the British would face a difficult situation. They would be compelled for their own protection to counter-attack the Germans in an island where they have been denied the use of the bases necessary to make defense possible. It is true that they would enjoy the advantages of geographical propinquity, a stronger navy, and, at least at first, greater air power. But on the other hand, Ireland offers no topographical obstacles to an invader and has no strong local defense lines. The Norwegian campaign demonstrated the enormous advantage possessed by the prepared side which strikes first according to a well-calculated plan and imposes on its opponents the necessity of making necessarily hurried and generally inadequate defense moves.

If it will be difficult for England to give Ireland help in case of attack, it will be almost impossible for the United States to act. With no base for operations closer than Iceland, we could not counter-attack with adequate air and sea power before the Germans had had ample time to consolidate their position. Moreover, American aid is likely to be unavailable owing to the needs of the Far East. Yet the danger to the United States from a German attack upon Ireland would be very great. Loss of bases from which we might ultimately launch an invasion of the Continent would mean the probable disappearance of a chance to win the war by decisive defeat of Germany. If we finally won, it would only be after a protracted war of exhaustion in which all the advantages of geography would rest with the Axis and which would take the "last full measure" of American liberty, money, and man-power.

How probable a German invasion of Ireland actually is no one can state with any certainty. Prior to the attack on Norway most military experts would have pronounced victory in such an attempt impossible. Yet Norway was also close to British bases and had infinitely stronger military and geographical defenses than has Ireland. The British keep large armies in England to guard against a German attack on the tight little isle. Yet Southern Ireland is virtually undefended, and a German occupation would place the British in so unfavorable a geographical position as almost to force them out of the war. The fact that only a few German bombs have fallen on the soil of Eire should not lead to complacency. Hitler rarely broadcasts his surprise moves.

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Ireland's Dilemma

BY MAXWELL S. STEWART

WHEN England declared war on Germany in September, 1939, following Hitler's invasion of Poland, the De Valera government of Eire decided to remain neutral. This decision had been expected. Despite Ireland's ties to Britain, Irish public opinion was strongly against active participation in the war. Rightly or wrongly, most of the people believed that England's fight was not Ireland's. Bitterness against England was still strong though the trade war had been settled and the Irish bases returned in the previous year. A decision to support England in the war would, it was feared, provoke a serious internal split. A decision to support Hitler in his policy of aggression was, of course, unthinkable.

For nearly two and a half years the De Valera government has sought to maintain this policy of strict neutrality in the face of increasing difficulties. At times skilful tight-rope walking has been required. And some incongruous situations have been created.

In the first place, Ireland has been in the position of wanting an Allied victory but refusing to lift a hand to achieve it. There can be no doubt that Irish sentiment has been predominantly on the side of England despite the long feud over independence. It is true that a considerable amount of anti-British feeling remains. But although Irishmen may experience some satisfaction in seeing the British suffer a few reverses, not many would like to see England lose the war. Prime Minister Eamon de Valera made it clear that Irish sympathies lay with England as early as September 2, 1939, when he outlined the Irish policy of neutrality in a speech before the Dail Eireann. The subsequent bombings of English cities deepened this bond of sympathy. Tens of thousands of Irish boys have enlisted in the British armies and may be found on every fighting front. When Belfast was attacked by German planes early in 1941, cities in Eire promptly sent equipment to help quench the flames started by Nazi bombs. Sympathy for Poland, a Catholic country, has led the church to be far more pro-British than it was in 1914. Knowledge of what Nazi occupation would mean to the church in Ireland has intensified this feeling.

Furthermore, certain basic political and economic factors make strict neutrality virtually impossible. Although wholly independent, Eire is still regarded in Westminster as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Northern Ireland, whose separate existence is not recognized by patriotic Irishmen, is officially at war with Germany. In the economic sphere the situation is even more paradoxical. The war has greatly increased Ireland's dependence on trade with Great Britain. This trade can only be carried on with the protection of the British fleet and the R. A. F. And yet Ireland has refused to accord any facilities to the British navy or air force.

Even this is not the worst part of the picture. In the effort to avoid giving the Nazis any pretext for invasion, the De Valera government has consistently enforced a rather one-sided conception of neutrality. Disputes have arisen between Ireland and England over four main issues: (1) the proposed extension of conscription to Northern Ireland; (2) the leasing by the British of the bases restored to Ireland in 1938; (3) measures for the joint defense of the two sections of Ireland; and (4) the internment of R. A. F. patrol planes landing on Irish soil. In each case the British have come out second best.

On two separate occasions the British government has sought to extend conscription to Northern Ireland. From the British point of view this seems perfectly logical. Northern Ireland is politically an integral part of the United Kingdom. There seems to be no reason why a subject of the king living in Ulster should be given preferential treatment over residents of Wales, Scotland, or England. Yet when the British government first proposed an extension of the draft in April, 1939, violent protests came from both Northern and Southern Ireland. The Irish Nationalists at Londonderry dispatched a message to Prime Minister de Valera asking him to "mobilize the Irish race at home and abroad immediately to resist the conscription of Irishmen." Speaking before the Dail on May 2, De Valera declared that while "lawyers might argue that Britain has a right to do this since Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom . . . we . . . regard [it] as an act of aggression." Two days later Prime Minister Chamberlain of Great Britain announced that the plan had been dropped. The speed with which the British retreated was generally regarded as a great personal triumph for De Valera.

Two years later, with Churchill as Prime Minister, the proposal was raised again. But once more De Valera's vigorous attacks, coupled with some opposition from Ulster Loyalists and Laborites, resulted in the plan being shelved. Although the British forces have not lost much in man-power as a result of this decision, the British feel that De Valera went far beyond any requirements of neutrality in interfering with Northern Ireland's share in the defense effort. If, as De Valera's supporters argue,

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America's Responsibility

"Peace! Does it not already seem a mockery? And a mockery it will remain unless America takes up the responsibility for the moral leadership of the world to which her consistent traditions, no less than the aims she has set herself in entering this war, entitle her. That headship at this moment is freely offered to her by the common sense and common consent of mankind." (De Valera writing in the *Irish World,* July 26, 1919.)

"It is in this fact, . . . that American ideals and American traditions are ideals and traditions of liberty and fearless justice, that Ireland's hope lies; and with Ireland's, the hope of the world." (July 31, 1919.)

domestic politics forced him to take this action, the British feel that he should offset it by taking steps favorable to Britain on other matters.

Specifically, the English would be satisfied if De Valera would make some arrangements for the temporary return of the ports of Cobh, Berehaven, and Lough Swilly, which were ceded to Ireland in the 1938 treaty. Officially, so far as we know, the British government has never asked for a return of these bases. But this is undoubtedly because De Valera has made it clear on several occasions that such a request would be rejected. At one time the Prime Minister went so far as to say that he would not give way on the question of bases even if the partition of Ireland were ended.

The importance of Irish bases in the Battle of the Atlantic is discussed elsewhere in this issue. Air bases are perhaps even more important than naval bases since aerial patrol planes must now go many miles out of their course in order to avoid flying over neutral Eire, where they face internment. It is probably fair to say that De Valera would gladly enter into some sort of an arrangement regarding air and naval bases if it were not for the fear that such action would be a signal for retaliatory bombing of Irish cities by the Nazis. The people of Eire know what bombing means. Dublin has suffered several attacks. But these have been nothing compared with those suffered by Belfast in Northern Ireland. Many families in Eire have come to the rescue of friends or relatives who were homeless refugees from the bombed sections of Ulster. Like the residents of Norway, Holland, Belgium, and Yugoslavia, the Irish have naturally wanted to save their cities as long as possible.

With the fall of France, the threat of an invasion of Ireland became very real. Although the government of Eire had been engaged in building up its defenses since the outbreak of the war, its regular army of 8,000 men and 5,000 reservists could hardly afford any real protection against the mechanized might of Adolf Hitler. Furthermore, the defense of the country was greatly hampered by the absence of coordination between the north and the south. On June 29, 1940, immediately after the collapse of France, the late Lord Craigavon, then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, declared that he was prepared to "enter into the closest cooperation" with Prime Minister de Valera for the joint defense of Ireland, provided this defense was an aid to Britain and the empire. De Valera replied that such a joint defense would be possible only if Northern Ireland were to drop out of the war and join Eire in a policy of neutrality. In fact if not in theory, the chief defense of Eire has been provided by the 200,000 or more British soldiers who have been stationed in Ulster since 1940. This force is, of course, at a great disadvantage in that it is kept far from the strategic areas likely to be attacked by the Germans. It is also at a peculiar disadvantage because of the proximity of neutral Eire. Last June the British army stationed in Ulster staged elaborate maneuvers designed to test tactical plans for combating an invasion of Britain by way of any part of Ireland. Since it was virtually impossible to keep German spies from crossing the border between Eire and Northern Ireland, it is almost certain that the maneuvers were witnessed by enemy agents. And once these agents had spirited the details of the maneuvers back across the border, the information could be forwarded to Berlin in a sealed diplomatic pouch.

Supporters of De Valera's policy argue that Eire could defend itself if Britain and the United States would provide it with an adequate supply of arms. They point out that 30 per cent of the country's budget is earmarked for defense, and insist that if England would furnish the supplies previously agreed upon, there need be no worry about a Nazi invasion. Unfortunately for those who take this position, Irish resources are clearly inadequate for any real defense against the Nazis. The Irish budget for 1941-42 totaled only £40,000,000, of which about £13,000,000 is available for defense. While the Irish claim an army of 250,000 men, it consists almost entirely of untrained, unequipped volunteers. If Hitler attacks, Ireland's only real hope for successful defense rests with the British navy, the army in Ulster, and the Royal Air Force.

Considerable uneasiness has arisen recently in England regarding Eire's policy of interning all R. A. F. planes which are forced to land there. If the planes were engaged solely in convoying British supplies, there would, of course, be little ground for complaint. But it happens that these aerial patrols are essential for the preservation of Eire's own life line. One of the planes recently interned had run short of fuel while convoying a food ship to Ireland. The Irish public does not know this. Eire's censor has refused to permit the Irish press to

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mention the fact that ships with food for Ireland must travel in British convoys. If the people were told the truth, they might demand a change in policy.

The existence of the anomalies mentioned above is readily admitted by De Valera's supporters. But they maintain that Ireland's ability to remain out of the war thus far has justified his policies. Few have stopped to calculate their long-term cost. No one seems to have thought through, for example, what would happen if Great Britain or the United States, provoked beyond endurance by unnecessary shipping losses, should seize the bases they require. De Valera has made it clear on numerous occasions that such an effort would be met by resistance. As recently as January 12 of this year he declared that Eire would defend its territory "against any aggressor, no matter who he may be." Such resistance, it need hardly be added, could hardly be more effective against the Allies than against the Germans. In fact, British control of the seas would probably make seizure of the ports a relatively easy task.

What would happen in Ireland in this eventuality? Would De Valera hurriedly send to Berlin for assistance? And if he did, would it be forthcoming? It is doubtful whether De Valera himself could answer these questions. But regardless of how they are answered, Ireland's destiny would be linked with that of Germany. In the event of an Allied victory, which is assumed by even the anti-British I. R. A., the representatives of Ireland would sit on the wrong side of the peace table. After the last war the nascent Irish Republic received powerful support from the United States at the Peace Conference. Today, by refusing to aid the United States in its hour of need, the government of Eire threatens to transform that support into hostility. And failing support from the United States, where will Ireland turn? Hardly to Britain, whose proffers of mutual assistance it has repeatedly rejected. Where else? After the last war the new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was a powerful friend. Can De Valera count on that friendship again when he has refused aid to Russia's allies? Or must he cast his lot irrevocably with Hitler?

Any balance sheet showing the results of Eire's neutrality would, of course, record on the credit side such benefits as Ireland has received by staying out of the war. Its cities are relatively intact, having been spared repeated bombings, but there is little else on the credit side. In the last war Irish farmers enjoyed unprecedented prosperity because of the high price of foodstuffs. In this war Irish economy has suffered acutely. The prices of foodstuffs have been held at such a low



"GOD BLESS EIRE'S NEUTRALITY—UNTIL THE FÜHRER GETS THERE"

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level by the British Ministry of Food that Irish farmers have barely cleared their costs of production. Irish industries fared somewhat better at first but have subsequently been hampered by shortages of raw materials. The Irish have also had great difficulty in getting enough wheat. Because of Eire's non-belligerent status, Irish importers have not been able to obtain the shipping priorities available to English importers.

In general, Ireland's neutrality has not helped it to escape the economic effects of the war. On the contrary, its burdens have probably been heavier than if it had been a belligerent. In an attempt to provide defenses where no defenses existed, the government of Eire has been compelled to boost taxes to an unprecedented degree. The first boost came even before the outbreak of war—in the spring of 1939—as a result of obligations taken on with the return of the bases formerly defended by Britain. To provide funds for a £5,500,000 defense appropriation the income tax was increased one shilling on the pound (5 per cent) bringing the tax to five shillings sixpence on the pound. Surtaxes and special taxes on high incomes were also increased. In November of the same year, after the outbreak of war, the income tax was raised another shilling on the pound. Surtaxes and estate duties were further increased, and additional levies were placed on beer and whiskey.

There was little change in 1940, but the record £40,000,000 budget introduced by Finance Minister Sean T. O'Kelly on May 7, 1941, imposed heavy new burdens. The income tax was raised another shilling on the pound, bringing the total to seven shillings and sixpence (37½ per cent). Death duties were increased another 10 per cent, and there were still further increases in surtaxes and the excess-profits levy. The gasoline tax—largely nominal because of drastic rationing—was raised from ten to fifteen pence a gallon, and it was planned to raise the almost incredible sum of £2,000,000 by additional levies on pipe tobacco and cigarettes.

While not in the war, Ireland has had to adapt itself tc all the disadvantages of a war economy. In May, 1941, a drastic order was issued under the Emergency Powers Act stabilizing wages and making any increase in transport, utility, or insurance rates illegal. Yet living costs have risen sharply, and, in contrast with the situation in the belligerent countries, unemployment has increased. At the beginning of the war the motor-car-assembly industry, one of Eire's major industries, was virtually suspended because of the restrictions on the sale of gasoline. Thousands of men in other industries have been thrown out of work by the increasing difficulty of getting raw materials.

Ireland has had rationing, blackouts, general economic dislocation, and many of the other manifestations of war without being in the war. It has not even succeeded wholly in escaping death from the air. On at least three occasions Eire has suffered from Nazi air raids. The first of these occurred on August 26, 1940, when three Nazi bombers dropped about ten bombs in County Wexford. Three girls were killed in the wrecking of a creamery, and two other girls were injured. After an investigation, the German government apologized, claiming the attack was a mistake. But during the first three days of January, 1941, Nazi planes bombed Curragh, Julianstown, Duleek, Borris, and several densely populated sections of Dublin. Whole blocks of houses were severely damaged in the capital, and more than a score of persons were injured. Again Germany apologized; but its planes returned on May 31 in the most severe raid of all. On this occasion four bombs fell in the city of Dublin, killing thirty persons and injuring more than one hundred. Other bombs were dropped near Arklow in County Wicklow without doing serious damage. As in the case of the earlier attacks, the Nazis expressed regret for their "mistake."

Despite the cost, despite unwarranted bombings, and despite an almost universal desire to see the Allies win, there can be no doubt that De Valera has had the support of an overwhelming majority of the Irish people in his policy of neutrality. At the same time there appears to be a growing feeling that Eire should play fair with England and the United States by making some arrangement about the bases. This view was expressed quite sharply in a speech delivered in the Dail last July by James Dillon, deputy leader of the Fine Gael Party. Mr. Dillon declared that the Dail Eireann "should ascertain precisely what Great Britain and the United States may require to insure success against the Nazi attempt at world conquest and offer to the United States and Great Britain that cooperation to the limit of our resources."

Two years ago such a statement could hardly have been made in the Dail. Even six months ago these views were held only by a small minority of the Irish people. Today they undoubtedly reflect a much more substantial sector of opinion. Tomorrow the minority may become the majority.

America Makes a Difference

"Until America entered the war the Irish people had no thought that the end of it would bring freedom to any small people whatever. . . . When America entered the war it made a difference. America's history had been different; and men who were more than skeptical until then of the professions of all governments felt impelled to throw their reasonable doubts to the winds." (From a speech delivered by De Valera in Brooklyn, as reported in the *Irish World*, September 17, 1919.)

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De Valera's Neutrality

BY WILLIAM J. M. A. MALONEY

THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY OF 1921

AT THE peace conference which in 1921 settled the Anglo-Irish war, the negotiators had to adjust (1) Ireland's claim to all its soil, (2) the desire of the Irish Loyalists of Ulster to be left undisturbed in their British allegiance, and (3) England's requirement that its security should be maintained.

The solution of these conflicting claims embodied in the treaty signed at London gave to twenty-six counties of Ireland the status of member of the British Commonweath of Nations, under the name of the Irish Free State. The Loyalists received the remaining six counties, which were given local self-government and were united with Great Britain under the name Northern Ireland.

For Britain's security, the Irish representatives conceded not only the bridgehead of Northern Ireland but also the provisions set forth in Article 7, which read:

> The government of the Irish Free State shall afford to His Majesty's Imperial forces
>
> (a) In time of peace such harbor and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from time to time be agreed between the British government and the government of the Irish Free State; and
>
> (b) In time of war or of strained relations with a foreign power such harbor and other facilities as the British government may require for the purposes of such defense as aforesaid.

The negotiators evidently considered the islands of Britain and of Ireland to be a single strategic unit for defense purposes, and the Irish Free State, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, to be jointly concerned with Britain for their common safety. In the event of Britain's declaring war the stipulations of Article 7 of the treaty made the Irish Free State a co-belligerent.

The facilities "indicated in the Annex" were Lough Swilly in County Donegal, Berehaven on Bantry Bay, and Queenstown. In the First World War Lough Swilly had sheltered thirty British destroyers that operated in the North Atlantic, Berehaven had given invaluable dockyard facilities to the heavy British naval units that controlled the western seas, and Queenstown had been the base of the thirty-four American destroyers that held open the southern approaches to England.

The treaty, which bears Winston Churchill's signature but not De Valera's, did not wholly satisfy any of the parties to it. De Valera, who had been instrumental in getting the Irish to accept the truce which permitted the treaty negotiations, held the British Commonwealth to be a mighty and admirable aggregation of Christian nations, each marching to political equality with Britain. On such terms as would permit a united Ireland ultimately to acquire a similar status he was prepared to lead his country into that Commonwealth; but on deciding that the treaty did not offer such terms, he denounced it.

Signed at London on December 6, 1921, the treaty led to heated discussions in the Dail before it was finally ratified, by sixty-four votes to fifty-seven, on January 7, 1922. The electorate then approved it by a vote of 486,419 to 133,864.

De Valera still scorned it. In its place he offered a document, usually referred to as Document Number 2, which he entitled "A Proposed Treaty of Association Between Ireland and the British Commonwealth." Many professed to see merely verbal differences between the actual treaty and the one proposed by De Valera. But his alternative Article 7 read: "That so far as her resources permit, Ireland shall provide for her own defense by sea, land, and air, and shall repel by force any attempt by a foreign power to violate the integrity of her soil and territorial waters, or to use them for any purpose hostile to Great Britain and the other associated states." De Valera omitted the pledge of harbor and other facilities to the British government in the event of war, and, by implication, proposed not co-belligerency but neutrality for Ireland. In fact, his whole document indicated toward the British Commonwealth a cautious co-operation which he called "external association."

The dispute over the treaty brought the disaster of civil war to the Irish Free State. Believing De Valera's protestations that the treaty made Ireland subject to Britain and that his Document Number 2 was a charter of ultimate independence, the fighting Irish Republicans rallied to its defense. Carrying with them the war-weary author of the document, they battled valiantly until May, 1923, when they were finally compelled to lay down their arms.

Turning to constitutional means, De Valera, the whilom chief of the rebellion against the Irish Free State, came to preside over it less than ten years later, and as its head began to lead his people peacefully to the freedom he proposed for them. Bit by bit he nibbled away the treaty he had denounced in arms. At no one time did he take more than England must perforce concede to a sovereign member of the British Common-

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wealth of Nations. As he pursued his purpose his invariable theme was: "We are going to get our independence of Britain, but we are not going to allow our territory, under any consideration, to be made use of by some foreign power as a base of attack against Britain." By 1937 the Irish Free State had disappeared even in name. In its place was Eire—Gaelic for Ireland—with a constitution immediately applicable to the twenty-six counties but avowedly planned for "the whole island of Ireland, its islands, and its territorial seas."

CHAMBERLAIN RETURNS THE BASES

Preoccupied with the growing menace of Hitler and desirous of preserving unity within the Commonwealth, the British government on December 29, 1937, informed Prime Minister de Valera that it was "prepared to treat the new constitution as not effecting a fundamental alteration in the position of the Irish Free State in future, to be described under the new constitution as 'Eire' or 'Ireland,' as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations . . . "; and added that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had intimated that they also were prepared to treat the new constitution in like manner. Disregarding Prime Minister de Valera's open, unilateral, progressive repudiation of the treaty of 1921, the Chamberlain government entered into an agreement (April 25, 1938) with him by which the provisions of Article 7 and its Annex, which made of the Irish Free State a co-belligerent with Britain at war, ceased "to have effect." Eire also obtained at last full and final possession of Lough Swilly, Berehaven, and Queenstown.

In 1921 Winston Churchill had signed the treaty returning these bases to a co-belligerent Irish Free State, member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In 1938 this watchdog of the Commonwealth growled against giving them up to De Valera's Eire. With incisive logic Churchill warned that the possession of these bases by a neutral Eire would cost England dearly in the event of war; nevertheless, the British Parliament ratified the agreement.

The British legislators ignored Mr. Churchill's warning, confident that self-defense would constrain Eire to stand with Britain in the event of war. And their confidence was not baseless, for as late as February 7, 1939, Prime Minister de Valera informed the Dail that "it would be impossible for Eire, much as she desired it, to remain neutral in the event of war between Britain and any other country." Yet seven months later De Valera essayed the impossible. When Britain declared war, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa assumed the obligation of co-belligerency as members of the British Commonwealth. Had Eire been armed, it too might have stood up, like Northern Ireland, with relative impunity. Perhaps Eire feared its fate too much; but to enter a mechanized war with "bare hands" seemed a suicidal risk. Had Eire been as far from German vengeance as Canada, or as Australia, that risk might have been taken. But it was certainly within the right of Eire as a sovereign state to refuse to take the risk, and to dissociate itself from the other nations of the Commonwealth by a declaration of neutrality. Such a declaration was, in fact, a further affirmation of Eire's sovereign status. Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and other small sovereign states had already indicated their intent to remain neutral. So Prime Minister de Valera accepted from Hitler's minister at Dublin a pledge of Germany's benevolence and declared Eire's neutrality.

His declaration was ratified by Eire's legislators, even by those who had maintained in arms against him the sanctity of the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921. The vote did not indicate any lack of sympathy toward England, but only an instinctive shrinking from a sudden, terrible war that was none of Eire's making and that it could ill sustain.

The bishops of Ireland were then no more militant than the legislators. Fully informed of every phase of Hitler's war on the church, the Irish hierarchy neither openly protested nor made any public attempt to rally the Catholic millions of Eire in a crusade to defend the church abroad. At first they may not have believed all that was reported about the Hitler persecution. It may have been hard for them to imagine Franco's powerful ally in the defense of the church in Spain in the role of an anti-religious monster. Yet no Irish priest could mistake what Hitler was doing; not so long ago it was penal also in Ireland to be Catholic, and the lot of the Irish priest then was not unlike the plight in which the war had placed the priests of Poland.

TERRORISM IN ULSTER

Like Poland, too, Ireland was partitioned, and the partition legitimized by treaty. The fact that his own representatives had sanctioned partition was no comfort to the Nationalist of Northern Ireland. Inasmuch as Tyrone and Fermanagh had Nationalist majorities, there was never any moral justification for their inclusion with the four Loyalist counties. In the six counties together, however, the Loyalists outnumbered the Nationalists more than two to one. Since in this part of Ireland Loyalist commonly connoted Protestant, Britain had secured as a bridgehead a Loyalist Protestant state with a permanent Nationalist and Catholic minority.

Although outnumbered, the Catholic Nationalists of Northern Ireland have kept up the struggle for freedom from British rule, and the Protestants of the six counties, now armed with all the powers of government, have brought peace with their clubs. At times the Catholic hierarchy has found it hard to encourage in Northern Ireland the respect for legally constituted authority that

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
RED CARPET FOR THE INVADER
O'QUISLING: "Would yez like to finish it in German?"
Defence of Ireland as Province
Defence of Ireland as bit of Empire
BELFAST
DUBLIN

IRISH ARGUMENT

it usually ordains. In fact, the sorely vexed Primate of Ireland, Cardinal McRory, Archbishop of Armagh, declared on one occasion that Ireland was "an ancient land made one by God, partitioned by a foreign power against the vehement protests of her people."

While incessantly fighting its indomitable Catholic minority, the government of Northern Ireland has had to defend itself on other fronts. Prime Minister de Valera, with the British standing helplessly by, has progressively repudiated the terms of the treaty that legitimized the partition. In 1937 Eire adopted a constitution specifically including the territory of Northern Ireland. Two years later the Irish Republican Army issued a proclamation calling "upon England to withdraw her armed forces, her civilian officials, and institutions and representatives of all kinds from every part of Ireland," and implemented the proclamation by raiding the border blockhouses and supply depots of the six counties and conducting a campaign of assassination by time bombs in letter-boxes and parcel offices in Britain.

The Irish Republican Army had some 1,500 members in Northern Ireland. To meet their challenge it was the duty of the government to use such force as was necessary. A hundred or two special police—"B specials" as they are locally known—might have been enough. Had 500 been used, the I. R. A. would have felt compli-

mented. But no fewer than 18,000 are said to have been signed on. This means that one out of perhaps every ten male Protestants of draft age in Northern Ireland has made the hounding of his Catholic neighbor his chief war contribution.

In his Lenten Pastoral last year the Bishop of Down and Connor wrote of conditions in his diocese as follows:

> Raids on Catholic houses by the forces of the government have taken place in Belfast on a scale that is almost incredible. They began in September, 1939, and have continued regularly since then. Till the end of September, 1940, raids as reported in the *Irish News* occurred on fifty-two dates, averaging one each week; and it must be remembered that there were many other raids that were never reported. . . . Last October the Minister of Public Security said "the raids will go on," and in pursuance of that policy from the middle of November till the end of last December raids were carried on almost nightly. . . . Many families were involved on each occasion; for instance, on the eighteenth of July it was reported that one hundred houses were raided. . . .
>
> During these raids many arrests were made; some of the men were interned, some were imprisoned, and the rest after being detained for hours at the police station were released. Many of those released, for whose arrest no reason could be alleged, when they returned to their places of employment next morning were informed that

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others had got their jobs. In the light of this, who would deny that the raids were successful. . . .

As Catholics, we are constrained to enter a most emphatic protest against these continued, these wanton violations of our Catholic homes, these gross indignities to our Catholic families.

NEUTRALITY DIVIDES EIRE

With Ireland partitioned and with terrorism in the occupied six counties, with Eire still mourning not only the four hundred thousand who fell unheeded in Britain's ranks during the last World War but also the men who died in Ireland fighting to free it from England, Britain could scarcely take a moral stand against Eire's neutrality. But there were still valid grounds on which the neutrality policy might be attacked. Prime Minister de Valera considered these scrupulously, but nothing availed against his fears for Eire's survival. Britain, despite the glorious heroism of its airmen, could not effectively defend its own soil. Vast areas of London had become rubble, and Coventry was a byword for death and destruction. So De Valera, less from free choice than from fear of Hitler, held to neutrality.

Official commentators explained to the people of Eire why their Prime Minister must intern impartially such British and German airmen as landed in the country, why he officially forbade public debate on the merits of the contestants, why it was politic to placate Hitler by bowing to his blows and by giving precedence to German over British war news, why it was prudent to "play down" the war both over the radio and in the press, and why it was especially necessary to ban the publication of the names of the men of Eire who were wounded or killed in the British service. While De Valera stuck to his role, his ministers went up and down the country exhorting the people to put away all thought of war, to make their neutrality without blemish. Persuaded by their own propaganda, they did not seem to notice that neutrality had divided Ireland as no treaty had done, that it had convinced the unbiased that the bridgehead of Northern Ireland was vital to the survival not only of Britain but also of "the democratic way of life," and that it had ended the hope of seeing a united Ireland in our time—for in the name of democracy the United States has felt impelled to help fortify this bridgehead. In addition, neutrality had conferred permanence on Eire's voluntary dissociation from the British Commonwealth of Nations and had alienated any sympathy Eire ever enjoyed among the other Allied powers.

Not the least of the evils that flowed from neutrality was the paralyzing effect on the official mind. Once there was no braver or more far-seeing man in Eire than Sean Lemass, De Valera's Minister of Supplies. Yet on January 3, 1942, he publicly stated: "In this present we hope not for posterity but for preservation, and we know that our preservation is, to say the least of it, very doubtful. . . . The circumstances that might exist after the war, or the plans the victorious powers might have for the reordering of the affairs of mankind, and the place, if any, we might have in those plans, are matters about which we could know nothing."

Happily this abject official state of mind has not corrupted the people of Eire. Many walked out on De Valera's neutrality performance, and he justly made no attempt to stop them. Neither did the church. At every station on the border of Northern Ireland small groups of men from Eire could daily be seen making their way into the six counties to fight or work for Britain; yet without a last blessing from the parish priest few would have thought of going. On an average six thousand men a month are said to have thus aided Britain's war effort. Of these, W. H. Carter, writing in the *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1941, estimated that some 70,000 had joined the British fighting forces. In a Report from Ireland to the *American Mercury* of last December William Bayles said that British enlistments from Eire had then risen to the stupendous total of 150,000. This is five times the number in Eire's regular army. It is also more than 5 per cent of Eire's entire population. Bayles believed there must be added to this 150,000 as many more who have gone to work in the war industries of Britain. It is probable that a tenth of Eire's total population is actively in the war—unofficially and as individuals of course, but with their whole heart.

AMERICA MAKES A DIFFERENCE

While the men of Eire were voluntarily making this magnificent, unheralded contribution to the British forces, the aspect of the war definitely changed. Italy suffered eclipse, Germany met defeat in Russia, and the Axis lost in both strength and leadership, while the Allies gained decisive dominance by the adhesion of the United States. With this change, Eire awoke from the nightmare of Nazi vengeance to find that its official neutrality, defensible no longer than it could be reasonably pleaded as essential to its very existence, had grown somehow into a fearful yet comfortable habit which twenty-eight months of practice made hard to give up.

Eire dreads uncharted changes and waits for events to determine its course, but meanwhile the United States and Canada have to face the hazards of the Arctic seas in order to maintain communication with Britain. This northern route is hard to patrol and takes a heavy toll of men, ships, material, and time. The one and only base for the effective defense of the Atlantic sea lanes is Eire. With the aid of Eire the Atlantic could be made reasonably safe for an American expeditionary force. The 20,000,000 people of Irish blood in the United States will be well represented in that force.

For their sake, for the sake of the 150,000 Irish who

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have gone to the war from Eire, of the 1,200,000 in Northern Ireland, of the 2,000,000 belligerent Irish in Britain, of the co-belligerent Irish in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa—in short, for the sake of the whole Irish race outside of Eire it is a comfort to note that a responsible official of Eire has at last ventured to hint that neutrality is not necessarily permanent, and may, indeed, be suddenly given up. On January 10, 1942, Dr. James Ryan, Minister of Agriculture, was able to announce: "When the position becomes acute there will be some who will favor departure from neutrality. . . . There may possibly be a stampede."

Divided, isolated, and defenseless in a world at war Eire today could not well be in a more acute situation. Controlling all its channels of communication, Prime Minister de Valera could start the stampede overnight.

Eire's Search for Self-Sufficiency

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

NOBODY resembles the mythical "economic man" of the classical economists so little as the Irishman. Nor does the history of Ireland lend itself easily to the materialist interpretation of the Marxist, for in that troubled isle the primacy of politics over economics has been almost constant. Hence in any discussion of Irish political economy past or present the accent must inevitably be placed on the adjective rather than the noun.

Since 1932, when he first became head of the government of the Irish Free State, Eamon de Valera has pressed steadily toward the goal of a completely independent, reunited Irish republic. The economic counterpart of this program has been an effort to make his country self-supporting, to break the conspiracy between nature and the English which hitherto has served to bind Ireland's economy to that of Britain. This policy has brought Ireland few, if any, material gains on balance, and at times Mr. de Valera has appeared to be cutting off his country's nose to spite the faces of his enemies. Yet it must be admitted that from his own point of view and from that of the majority of people whom he leads he has had a large measure of success. For his primary aim has not been prosperity but freedom, and he has been encouraged rather than deterred by the realization that poverty is often the reward of virtue. "If we cannot have silk shirts," he once declared, "let us have homespuns."

It is in this spirit that the drive toward self-sufficiency has been undertaken in Eire. The aim has been to transform its economy so that it serves Irish needs instead of English uses. Explaining this policy in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* of January 13, 1940, Maurice Walsh voiced the widespread belief that Britain had sought to maintain Ireland as a kind of colonial cattle ranch, "a place where there was the best food for England, good sport, a simple standard of living for the aborigine—a place to visit in summer and forget in the winter." While first-quality Irish beef, butter, and bacon used to be sent across the channel, inferior foods were imported for home consumption. That has been largely changed, and in the five years following 1931 such imports were reduced by 80 per cent. In the last ten years numerous light industries have sprung up in Eire; so that now a wide range of consumers' goods is produced at home.

Since it was already committed to a policy of economic nationalism, Eire bore the trials of the Anglo-Irish trade war which raged from 1932 to 1938 with comparative equanimity. This conflict was precipitated by Mr. de Valera's decision, soon after becoming Prime Minister, to cancel the land-annuity payments to Britain. These annuities represented interest and principal on loans made to Irish farmers for the purchase of their lands by private English investors, who, however, received a guaranty from the British government. From the British point of view they were a legal commercial debt and were not covered by the clause of the Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 which relieved the Free State of any liability for the national debt of the old United Kingdom. To Mr. de Valera and his followers the payment of the annuities appeared as the rendering of tribute.

THE ANGLO-IRISH TRADE WAR

Britain's reply to the default of the Irish government in respect of the annuities was a parliamentary authorization to the Treasury to impose duties on imports from the Free State up to 100 per cent over and above any existing duties. The sums obtained by this measure were to be earmarked to recoup the British government for moneys paid out in accord with its guaranties to the annuity holders. De Valera quickly retorted by clapping extra duties on leading categories of British goods exported to Ireland, and the battle was joined.

Economically it was a one-sided contest. Britain was practically the only market for Ireland's meat and dairy products and all in all absorbed over 90 per cent of Irish exports. On the other hand, it was not nearly so dependent on Irish purchases, which accounted for only

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some 10 per cent of its total shipments abroad. Nor was it a hardship for British consumers to be deprived of Irish supplies: Denmark, Holland, and the dominions were all eager and able to increase their exports of similar products. But Ireland not only could not dispose of

its goods elsewhere; it was even unable to arrange for satisfactory imports from non-British sources of such essentials as coal.

The result was that the prices of Irish farm products slumped disastrously, and exports to Britain were almost halved. The price of live cattle in the Free State fell from forty-five shillings a hundredweight in June, 1931, to twenty-five shillings; while during the same period the London price was lowered only eight shillings. At the same time the new retaliatory tariffs sharply increased prices of imported industrial goods which the Irish farmer had to buy. Attempts to arrange reciprocal trade agreements with other nations yielded meager results. Compared with 1933, total imports from countries other than Britain increased £2,236,214 but exports only £22,708. There were plenty of willing sellers, but willing buyers were almost as hard to find as Irish snakes.

The Anglo-Irish trade war continued until 1938, although its ferocity was modified by two different agreements. At the end of 1934 a pact was signed by which Britain increased its import quota for Irish cattle by about one-third and the Free State undertook to admit 1,250,000 tons of British coal. However, the special British duty of twenty shillings a head on cattle remained, as did the Irish duty on British coal of five shillings a ton. Since Irish cattle had to compete in an English market open to the meat of all the world, the duty was in effect paid either by the Irish farmer through lower prices or by the taxpayer through subsidies. But the Irish consumer and not the British mine owner paid the duty on coal, since there was no suitable alternative supply available. Speaking in the Dail on this agreement, Mr. Cosgrave, leader of the opposition, declared that the retained land annuities were being sent to Britain on the horns of Irish cattle, but Mr. de Valera defended it as a business transaction. "It was," he said, "the type of understanding the Irish government has always indicated its willingness to make." A second interim agreement in February, 1936, led to a greater improvement in the situation: Britain reduced its special imposts, and the Free State, which a few weeks earlier had canceled the coal duties, cut in half its retaliatory tariff on a number of important British manufactures.

So long as the trade war continued, Ireland was certainly getting the worst of it from the economic standpoint, but if the British government believed that it could weaken the political position of De Valera and his Fianna Fail Party by hitting the Irish farmer and taxpayer, it made a sad mistake. This was demonstrated in the general election of 1933, when Fianna Fail increased its membership in the Dail from seventy to seventy-seven. The fact was that the chief victims of the trade war were the big farmers of the central plains and the city merchants, who in any event were Cosgrave supporters. The poverty-stricken subsistence farmers of the west, who had no cash crops, the landless laborers, and the urban poor continued to vote for the man who stood up to the British and provided them with relief payments, free beef, and free milk.

The trade war also helped Mr. de Valera to push ahead with his plans to encourage tillage in the place of cattle farming, so that the country could feed itself, and to build up local industries which would keep money at home. Sheltered by high tariffs, new factories were started all over Ireland. By 1935 Free State mills, which before the advent to power of Fianna Fail were producing only half the flour consumed in the country, were grinding out its full requirements. A rapid growth in the cultivation and refining of beet sugar made possible the reduction of imported sugar to 20 per cent of consumption. Unfortunately, this industrial progress was not reflected in the reduction of unemployment, which remained a serious problem and would have become still more grave had not Britain continued to offer an unrestricted haven to Free State emigrants.

While the economic war dragged on to the detriment of Irish trade, it was little noticed in Britain, which was enjoying a period of recovery and industrial expansion. Yet in 1938 Mr. de Valera was able to win from the Chamberlain government a settlement which represented a real triumph. In return for a lump-sum payment of £10,000,000 Britain abandoned annuity and other outstanding claims with a capitalized value of £100,000,000. Retaliatory duties were abolished by both sides, and both states gave preferences to each other's goods. And at the same time Britain agreed to transfer to the government of Eire the three naval bases which had been retained by the treaty of 1921. It can never be said of Neville Chamberlain that he appeased only powerful nations.

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A BLOCKADED NEUTRAL

World War II has demonstrated to Eire both the advantages and the disadvantages of self-sufficiency. The tillage program, which has been extended by an order compelling occupiers to cultivate at least 20 per cent of their arable land, has enabled the country to get along without many foreign foodstuffs. The most serious deficiency is that of wheat; the most severe hardship, perhaps, the shortage of tea. Sugar is rationed, but the allowance is fairly adequate. The government's peat-cutting development, which is being energetically pushed, has provided some additional employment and has helped to compensate for much-reduced imports of British coal. But Eire, like many a larger nation, has found that home industries don't insure an independent supply of manufactured goods when raw materials are not locally available. In this matter nature has been niggardly toward Ireland, and neither Britain nor America has much it can spare from its armament program. Moreover, shipping is an increasingly acute problem. Eire has practically no mercantile marine of its own, and until the Battle of the Atlantic is definitely won, the Allied nations are hardly in a position to release many bottoms for its benefit. Nor has Eire's strict observance of neutrality saved it from inclusion within the German blockade zone or its ships from U-boat attacks.

Throughout 1940 unemployment remained one of the Irish government's worst headaches. It was intensified not only by the cessation of normal emigration but by an influx of refugees, mainly woman and children of Irish origin, seeking escape from the blitzed cities of Britain. The past twelve months, however, have seen an improvement, though one that can hardly be ascribed either to better business or to the efficacy of government relief schemes. It is due rather to the expansion of the Irish army, large-scale enlistments in the British services, and the lure of high wages in British munition factories, which has revived emigration.

Normally Eire imports a far greater value of goods annually than it exports, and its trade accounts are balanced by invisible exports such as interest on foreign investments, mainly in Britain, tourist expenditures, and emigrants' remittances. During the economic conflict with Britain the excess of imports was swollen to such an extent that accounts were only balanced by drawings on capital. Since 1939 exports to Britain have been fairly well maintained, although the price policies of the British Ministry of Food have not always seemed designed to encourage Irish farmers to increase their shipments, and with imports necessarily curtailed, the adverse balance of trade has shrunk in a spectacular manner. In fact, in recent months there has been an excess of exports, and as a result Eire's sterling holdings have been growing rapidly. In the view of some Irish authorities the strong financial position which is now being built up will prove a powerful political weapon after the war. Cormac MacAirt writes in the *Irish Echo* of New York:

> If, however, we escape invasion, and an overwhelming British defeat does not render the pound valueless, then—please God—the *Saorstat* is likely to emerge from the war in a very strong position materially; and this is bound to have a big effect on the partition issue and, in my opinion, will render the reunion of Ireland almost a certainty.

This hope, it will be noted, is conditioned on the absence of British disaster, but it must be pointed out that even in the event of an overwhelming victory for the United Nations, including Britain, the chances of the pound sterling escaping serious depreciation are not entirely favorable. Britain, too, has depended on the fruits of foreign investment to keep its international accounts straight. Now it is drawing heavily on these capital assets to finance its war effort, and, in addition, it is at this moment having to destroy or allow to fall into enemy hands some of its most valuable investments in the Far East. To the extent that the United States finds alternative supplies of rubber, part of this loss may prove permanent.

Shrinkage in income after the war may force further depreciation of the pound; it will certainly necessitate tremendous adjustments in British trade. If the universal movement toward freer trade envisioned in the Atlantic Charter is not realized, Britain may be forced to restrict its imports and press its exports in order to keep its economy on an even keel. That could mean very hard times for the Irish farmer unless his government consented to make some kind of barter arrangement with Britain, which in turn would probably react unfavorably on Eire's tariff-fostered industries. Despite all that has been done to make Eire more nearly self-supporting, its economy still hinges on its ability to export agricultural surpluses. As the Irish Commission of Inquiry into Banking, Currency, and Credit pointed out in 1938:

> The Free State is predominantly an agricultural country, which means not only that the greatest proportion

De Valera's Message to America
St. Patrick's Day, 1940

"We fully realize what we owe to the support given by our kin in the United States. With their aid we have secured the sovereign status we now enjoy in five-sixths of the national territory. We are genuinely grateful, and our gratitude establishes a further link binding the motherland to those millions of homes in America where today Ireland's national festival is being celebrated with the same sentiments of fervor and devotion with which we celebrate it in Ireland."

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> of the population gains its livelihood in agriculture but that the main exports required to pay for necessary imports are obtained from agriculture. . . . Access to profitable export markets for agricultural products will in the future as in the past govern the prosperity of the main body of the Irish people.

Even the group with the biggest vested interest in the self-sufficiency program has, it is worth noting, a good many doubts about its success. In the course of the 1941 budget debate, Erskine Childers, a member of Fianna Fail and secretary of the Federation of Irish Manufacturers, declared that the first twenty years of self-government had been disappointing. The national income, he said, had failed to expand, no new export markets had been established, and the fertility of the land had not been maintained. A few months earlier the same authority, in a lecture summarized by the *Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Ireland,* asserted that costs of production were too high in Ireland, and must be reduced if industries already established were to justify their existence.

Among the factors raising costs he included managerial inexperience, the smallness of the home market, high taxation, and the indiscriminate nature of tariff protection. He stressed the need for better organization and more intensive research, and said that too little attention had been paid to the development of special types of quality exports. Mr. Childers went on to advocate closer cooperation between workers and employers, to be obtained by the organization of vocational bodies which would include both and replace the Federation of Irish Manufacturers and the trade unions. In addition, he said, very large powers would have to be given to the government in order to insure the success of the industrial-development program for which it had made itself responsible.

In these proposals there is more than a suggestion of a move toward a corporative state on the Italian fascist model. Already under its war-time powers the government of Eire is regulating wages, prices, and almost every detail of economic life. Mr. Childers's program appears to look toward the perpetuation and broadening of these powers, a prospect which cannot fail to alarm those who have expected that independent Ireland would become a model democracy.

We can only hope that if partition is abolished and the republic established, Eire will feel secure enough to turn away from the paths of economic nationalism which lead large nations toward imperialism and small states toward social sterility. Certainly, a self-sufficient Eire could not hope for more than an extremely modest standard of living. Mr. de Valera may argue that simplicity is to be preferred, may reverse Marie Antoinette by saying, "Let us eat bread, and if need be, brown bread," and the voters may continue to indorse him. But so long as the Irish standard of living is definitely below that of neighboring countries, the young people will continue to repudiate that policy by emigrating. And Eire will remain a land of old folks and children, a land which must feed its spirit on the hatreds of the past because it can have no real hopes of the future.

[*I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness for a number of facts and figures quoted in this article to "Ireland, Past and Present," by Tom Ireland, just published by G. P. Putnam's Sons.*—K. H.]

CONTRIBUTORS

LEWIS S. GANNETT was on *The Nation* staff in the crucial years of Ireland's struggle for freedom. He now writes a daily column, Books and Things, for the New York *Herald Tribune.*

SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE left *The Nation* in 1920 to join Albert Jay Nock on the *Freeman,* where she ardently supported the campaign for Irish independence.

GEORGE W. NORRIS, veteran member of the United States Senate from Nebraska, was a member of the "court" formed in 1921 by the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland.

MARGARET MARSHALL is literary editor of *The Nation.*

WILLIAM L. SHIRER'S quiet radio voice is perhaps even better known than his "Berlin Diary," the widely read account of his experiences as foreign correspondent for Universal News Service and the Columbia Broadcasting System.

DONALD W. MITCHELL, avid student of naval and military history, last year completed a book on the defense problems of the United States. He analyzes the current military situation each week in *The Nation.*

MAXWELL S. STEWART, an associate editor of *The Nation,* planned and edited this supplement. He writes the annual articles on Ireland and Northern Ireland for "The National Encyclopedia Yearbook."

WILLIAM J. M. A. MALONEY, a distinguished New York neurologist, played an effective role in the Irish independence movement in this country and in the organization of the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland.

KEITH HUTCHISON, before becoming associated with *The Nation,* was for several years economic specialist in the New York *Herald Tribune's* London Bureau.

INFORMATION FOR SUSCRIBERS

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